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WILL TORT REFORM COMBAT THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND
AFFORDABILITY PROBLEMS THAT VIRGINIA'S
PHYSICIANS ARE FACING?
Virginia's physicians today are finding that medical malpractice insurance
is both unavailable and unaffordable.' In September 1986, the Pennsylvania
Hospital Insurance Company, which insured 1,100 of Virginia's physicians,

announced that effective November 1, 1986, it no longer would insure a
physician who a hospital does not employ or who does not practice in a
group of at least ten physicians. 2 The Virginia Insurance Reciprocal and St.
Paul Fire and Marine, two other major medical malpractice insurers in
Virginia, both announced that they would not write new malpractice insur-

1. See S. Doe. No. 11, REPORT OF TH JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING TnE LiABirui
INSURANCE CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM TO THE GOVERNOR AND TIE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA OF

1987, at 12-13 (1987) (medical malpractice insurance is unavailable

and unaffordable to Virginia's physicians). A Joint Subcommittee of the Virginia General
Assembly studied the liability insurance crisis in Virginia and made proposals to the 1987
Virginia General Assembly regarding the need for tort reform in Virginia. Id. at 3-4. The
Joint Subcommittee stated that commentators believe that liability insurance coverage is
unavailable and unaffordable because of the insurance industry's $3 billion annual increase in
underwriting losses from 1979-1983. Id. at 6. The insurance industry initially was able to cover
the underwriting losses with investment income earned during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Id. The insurance industry's investment income, however, declined as interest rates declined,
resulting in a decreased surplus. Id. Because an insurance company must have a minimum
surplus to protect the insurance company from insolvency, any reduction in the amount of an
insurance company's surplus restricts that company's ability to write new insurance policies.
Id. The Joint Subcommittee stated that commentators believe that the increase in underwriting
losses occurred because the insurance companies wrote new policies at lower rates without
carefully selecting their insureds. Id. The insurance companies offered low rates to get more
premium dollars to invest at higher rates of interest. Id. at 7. As a result of the underwriting
loss, the insurance companies have had to increase the cost of insurance premiums to
compensate for the loss. Id.
The Joint Subcommittee also stated that while some commentators believe that the increase
in liability premiums resulted from underwriting losses, other commentators claim that medical
malpractice liability insurance is unavailable and unaffordable to physicians because insurance
companies are unable to predict accurately the insurer's exposure, due to frequent and severe
tort claims against physicians. Id. Although physicians' medical malpractice premiums accounted for only 2% of all property and casualty premiums written in 1985, underwriting
losses attributable to medical malpractice premiums accounted for 5% of all underwriting
losses. Id. at 6. Moreover, the average jury award in a medical malpractice action increased
from $166,165 in 1974 to $1,179,095 in 1985. Malpractice Suits: Doctors Under Seige,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1987, at 62. Furthermore, patients frequently file medical malpractice
suits against physicians. Id. One out of every five physicians is subject to a patient's medical
malpractice suit each year. Id. Physicians contend that tort reform is essential to ensure that
tort actions against physicians do not destroy the practice of medicine. Doctors and Lawyers
Face Off, A.B.A.J., July 1, 1986, at 38-39.
2. See S. Doc. No. 11, supra note 1, at 12-13 (1987) (medical malpractice insurer in
Virginia placed restrictions on coverage for physicians).
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ance policies providing coverage to obstetricians. 3 Additionally, for some
of Virginia's physicians who have been able to obtain medical malpractice
insurance, the cost of premiums nearly doubled in 1986 4 Adding to the
problems in the medical malpractice insurance area, in November 1986, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia declared
unconstitutional Virginia's statutory damage limitation of $1,000,000 against
a health care provider in a medical malpractice action.5
In response to the availability and affordability problems associated with
medical malpractice insurance, organizations representing Virginia's physi-6
cians lobbied for tort reform before the 1987 Virginia General Assembly.
On the advice of the Medical Society of Virginia, the Virginia General
Assembly passed the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, which establishes a no-fault reimbursement system for infants
neurologically injured at birth.7 In addition, the Virginians for Law Reform
(VLR), a group composed of several industries and trade associations in
Virginia, including the Medical Society of Virginia, was successful with
proposals suggesting that the 1987 Virginia General Assembly pass legislation
placing a cap on punitive damages in civil actions and sanctioning attorneys
who file frivolous lawsuits and motions.8 The 1987 Virginia General Assem-

3 See id. at 13 (malpractice insurers placed moratorium on medical malpractice coverage
for obstetricians in Virginia).
4. Intress, Debate on Medical Malpractice Cap is Revived, The Richmond Times
Dispatch, Nov. 16, 1986, at A-2. In 1986, medical malpractice coverage nearly doubled for
some of Virginia's physicians. Id. For example, one obstetrician in Virginia paid $70,000 for
medical malpractice insurance coverage, one neurosurgeon paid $90,000, and one general
surgeon paid $63,000. Id.
5. See Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 790 (W.D. Va. 1986) (holding unconstitutional
Virginia's statutory cap of $1,000,000 in medical malpractice action); see also VA. CODE §8.01-

581.15 (1984) (limiting recovery against health care provider in medical malpractice action to
$1,000,000); infra notes 42-72 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia's statutory cap on
recovery in medical malpractice action).
6. See Virginia Tort Reform Proposals- A Commentary (pt. 1), REcipRocAL NEws,
Nov./Dec. 1986, at I (defining Virginians for Law Reform as coalition of industries and trade
associations in Virginia fighting for tort reform) (a copy of Virginia Tort Reform Proposalsis
on file in the Washington & Lee Law Review Office); Orndorff, Medical Society Votes Dues
Boost to Aid InsuranceFight, The Richmond Times Dispatch, Nov. 11, 1986, at B-9 (stating
that Medical Society of Virginia raised membership dues in 1986 to fight for tort reform in
Virginia).
7. See VA. CODE §§ 38.2-5000-5021 (Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act); see also The Medical Society of Virginia's Position Paper on Liability Issues
in the 1987 General Assembly Session, at 3 (stating that Medical Society of Virginia proposed
that Virginia General Assembly enact Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Act) (a copy of the Medical Society of Virginia's Position Paper on Liability Issues in the
1987 General Assembly Session is on file in the Washington & Lee Law Review Office);
Summary of the Regular 1987 Session of the Virginia General Assembly, at 9 (noting that
1987 Virginia General Assembly passed Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act).
8. See Virginia Tort Reform Proposals, supra note 6, at I (stating that VLR proposed
that Virginia General Assembly cap punitive damages and sanction attorneys who file frivolous
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bly, however, did not adopt the VLR's proposal to cap noneconomic
damages that a plaintiff may recover from a defendant in a tort action.9
Moreover, the 1987 Virginia General Assembly rejected the VLR's proposal
to allow a defendant to pay future damages to a plaintiff in periodic
payments rather than in a lump sum payment. 0 Finally, the Virginia General
Assembly rejected the VLR's proposal to place limits on an attorney's
contingency fee." However, an evaluation of the tort reform measures that
the Medical Society of Virginia and the VLR proposed demonstrates that
the proposals would improve the medical malpractice insurance situation in
Virginia.
In an effort to persuade insurance companies to provide malpractice
insurance to obstetricians, the Medical Society of Virginia proposed that
the 1987 Virginia General Assembly enact the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (Act). 12 The Act compensates infants
who are impaired by birth-related neurological injuries 3 through a no-fault
system similar to workers' compensation.1 4 Under the Act, an infant who
sustains a birth-related neurological injury may not sue a participating

claims and motions); VA. CODE § 8.01-38.1 (1987) (placing $350,000 cap on punitive damages
in civil actions); VA. CODE § 8.01-271.1 (1987) (providing sanctions for attorneys who file
claims and motions in bad faith).
9. See Virginia Tort Reform Proposals, supra note 6, at 1 (VLR's proposals that
Virginia General Assembly cap noneconomic damages).
10. See id. (VLR's proposals that Virginia General Assembly allow defendant to pay
future damages to plaintiff in periodic payments).
11. See id. (VLR's proposals that Virginia General Assembly limit contingency fees for
attorneys).
12. See VA. CODE §§ 38.2-5000-5021 (Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act).
13. Id. The Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (the "Act")
defines a birth-related neurological injury as an injury to the brain or spinal cord that is
caused by the deprivation of oxygen or by mechanical injury that occurs during the course of
labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which causes
the infant to be permanently nonambulatory, aphasic, incontinent, and in need of assistance
in all phases of daily living. VA. CODE § 38.2-5001 (1987). Moreover, the Act only applies to
births in which the infant is born alive. Id.
14. See VA. H. 1216, 1987 General Assembly of Virginia at 3 (Act compensates neurologically injured infants through no-fault system similar to workers' compensation). To receive
compensation under the Act, the legal representative of a neurologically-injured infant must
file a petition with the Industrial Commission of Virginia within 10 years after the birth of
the infant. VA. CODE § 38.2-5013 (1987). In the petition, the legal representative shall state,
inter alia, the name of the physician who rendered obstetrical services at the birth of the
infant, and the facts and circumstances of the birth that gave rise to a claim under the Act.
VA. CODE § 38.2-5004 (1987). Moreover, the petitioner shall provide the Industrial Commission
with any documentation regarding the amount of compensation that the Industrial Commission
must provide for the birth-related neurological injury. Id. A panel of three qualified and
impartial physicians will review the petition and advise the Industrial Commission whether the
neurologically injured infant should receive compensation under the Act. VA. CODE § 38.25008 (1987). The Industrial Commission then holds a hearing for all parties at which time the
Commission determines whether the infant sustained a birth-related neurological injury within
the definition of the Act, and is, therefore, entitled to an award under the Act. Id.
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obstetrician'5 or hospital 6 in tort, but must file a claim for compensation
with the Industrial Commission of Virginia.' 7 The Act creates the Virginia
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Fund (Fund) to compensate
victims of birth-related neurological injuries. 18 To participate under the Act,
an obstetrician or hospital must make an annual contribution to the fund. 9
Moreover, the Act requires that all licensed physicians and liability insurers
in Virginia contribute to the fund annually. 20 The obstetrician or hospital
that elects to come under the Act must agree to submit to quality review
each time a claimant files a petition for compensation against the obstetrician
or hospital.2 Moreover, the participating obstetrician or hospital must agree
to provide medical care to indigent patients. 2 Finally, the Act is the injured
infant's sole remedy against an obstetrician unless the obstetrician inten23
tionally or willfully caused the birth-related neurological injury.
The purpose of the Act is twofold. First, the Medical Society of Virginia
designed the Act to ensure that infants mentally impaired because of birthrelated neurological injuries timely receive compensation for their injuries
without the financial and emotional difficulties of a lawsuit.2 4 If an infant's
injury is the result of a birth-related neurological injury, the infant can file
for compensation under the Act without having to prove that a physician

15. VA. CODE § 38.2-5001 (1987). The Act defines a participating physician as a physician
who is licensed in Virginia to practice medicine, and practices obstetrics or performs obstetrics
either full or part time. Id. Moreover, at the time of the birth-related neurological injury, the
physician must have (i) had in force an agreement with the Commissioner of Health under
which the physician agreed to participate in the development and implementation of a program
to provide obstetrical care to indigent patients and patients eligible for Medical Assistance
Services; (ii) had in force an agreement with the State Board of Medicine whereby the physician
agreed to submit to the Board of Medicine review of a claim that a claimant files under the
Act against the physician; and (iii) paid an assessment under the Act for the year in which
the birth-related neurological injury occurred. Id.
16. Id. The Act defines a participating hospital as a hospital licensed in Virginia which
at the time of the infant's injury (i) had in force an agreement with the Commissioner of
Health under which the hospital agreed to participate in the development and implementation
of a program to provide obstetrical care to indigent patients and patients eligible for Medical
Assistance Services; (ii) had in force an agreement with the State Board of Health whereby
the hospital agreed to submit to review of its obstetrical services; and (iii) paid an assessment
under the Act for the year in which the birth-related neurological injury occurred. Id.
17. VA. CODE § 38.2-5002 (1987). The Act states that the rights and remedies that the
Act grants an injured infant exclude all other common law rights and remedies that the infant,
his personal representative, parents, dependents, or next of kin has against a participant in
the Act's program for compensation. Id.
18. VA. CODE § 38.2-5015 (1987).
19. VA. CODE § 38.2-5018-5020 (1987).
20. Id.
21. VA. CODE § 38.2-5001 (1987).
22. Id.

23. VA. CODE § 38.2-5002 (1987).
24. The Medical Society of Virginia's Position Paper on Liability Issues in the 1987
General Assembly Session, supra note 7, at 3.
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or hospital was negligent.25 The second purpose of the Act is to stabilize
the insurance climate for obstetricians in Virginia. 26 The Medical Society of
Virginia contended that medical malpractice insurers would be more willing
to provide medical malpractice coverage to obstetricians if the insurers could
predict more accurately risks associated with the delivery of infants. 27 Indeed,
the Act already has stabilized the insurance climate for Virginia's obstetricians. 2 Since the Virginia General Assembly passed the Act, the Virginia

Insurance Reciprocal has agreed
to provide coverage to obstetricians for the
29
first time in nine months.
Although the Medical Society of Virginia has claimed that the Act will

ensure that a neurologically injured infant receives compensation from the
fund efficiently and without the cost of litigation, Patricia Danzon, an
associate professor of health care and insurance at the Wharton School in
Philadelphia, questions the putative advantages of no-fault compensation
programs such as the Act.3 0 Danzon believes that no-fault compensation
systems may not ensure that a plaintiff receives timely compensation without
the expense of litigation. 3' Danzon reasons that litigation may arise over

the issue of causation. 32 For example, under the Act, litigation may arise
over whether the infant's injuries are compensable birth-related neurological
3
injuries or other types of injuries that are not compensable under the Act.
Danzon, however, states that legislators may curtail litigation over causation
if the no-fault system explicitly designates the types of injuries that are
compensable under the no-fault system.3 4 Whether the Act narrowly defines
the types of birth-related neurological injuries that are compensable under
the Act to reduce litigation will be determined after the Act goes into effect
3
on January 1, 1988. 1

25. See VA. CODE §§ 5000-5021 (1987). To receive compensation under the Act, a
petitioner must prove that an infant received a birth-related neurological injury, and that a
physician who participates under the Act attended the infant at birth; see VA. CODE § 5001
(1987), supra note 7, at 1 (defining birth-related neurological injury); VA. CODE § 5001 (1987),
supra note 7, at 1 (defining participating physician).
26. The Medical Society of Virginia's Position Paper, supra note 7, at 3.
27. Id.
28. See infra note 29 (discussing Act's impact on medical malpractice insurance for
obstetricians in Virginia).
29. Obstetricians Get Coveragefor Malpractice, Roanoke Times & World News, Mar.
6, 1987, at BI. Although the Virginia Insurance Reciprocal again is providing medical

malpractice insurance to obstetricians since the Virginia General Assembly passed the Act, the
Virginia Insurance Reciprocal will not reduce immediately the former cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums for obstetricians. Id. See notes 12-23 and accompanying text
(discussing Act).
30. See P. DANZON,

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:

THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, at

213-19 (1985) [hereinafter DA'zON] (discussing no-fault compensation programs).
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 214.
Id. at 214-16.
See VA. CODE § 38.2-5001 (1987) (defining birth-related neurological injuries).
DANzoN, supra note 30, at 215-17.

35. See 16, VA. CODE § 38.2-5001 (1987) (defining birth-related neurological injuries);
§ 38.2-5002-5014 (1987) (establishing effective date of Act).

VA. CODE
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In addition to the proposal by the Medical Society of Virginia for a nofault compensation program for birth-related neurological injuries, the VLR
proposed that the 1987 Virginia General Assembly cap noneconomic damages and punitive damages that a plaintiff may recover from a defendant
in tort actions.3 6 The VLR proposed that the Virginia General Assembly
place a $250,000 cap on the noneconomic damages that a plaintiff may
recover from a defendant in tort actions. 37 The 1987 Virginia General
Assembly's House Bill 1085, which embodied the VLR's proposal, stated
that the recovery of noneconomic damages in all personal injury or death
actions, including medical malpractice actions, should not exceed the greater
of three times the damage amount for economic losses or $250,000.38 The
VLR also proposed that the 1987 Virginia General Assembly place a $250,000
cap on the punitive damages that a plaintiff may recover from a defendant
in a tort action.3 9 Although the 1987 Virginia General Assembly rejected
the VLR's proposal to place a $250,000 cap on both noneconomic and
punitive damages, the General Assembly did adopt a $350,000 cap on
punitive damages that a plaintiff can recover against a defendant in a civil
action.4o
Although the 1987 Virginia General Assembly adopted the VLR's proposal to cap punitive damages, the constitutionality of caps on damages is
uncertain. 4 ' The Virginia General Assembly already has placed a $1,000,000
limit on the total damage amount that a plaintiff may recover against a
43
42
health care provider in a medical malpractice action. In Boyd v. Bulala,

36. Virginia Tort Reform Proposals, supra note 6, at I.
37. Id.
38. See Va. H. 1085, 1987 General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (proposal
to limit noneconomic damages to $250,000). House Bill 1085 proposes that the Virginia General
Assembly place a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages. Id. House Bill 1085 states that
noneconomic damages include damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience,
loss of consortium, disfigurement or deformity, associated humiliation or embarrassment and
other nonpecuniary injuries. Id.
39. Virginia Tort Reform Proposals,supra note 6, at 1.
40. See Summary of the Regular 1987 Legislative Session of the Virginia General
Assembly, at 8-9 (stating that 1987 Virginia General Assembly placed $350,000 cap on punitive
damages in civil action but rejected proposed legislation to cap noneconomic damages). The
VLR proposed that the Virginia General Assembly codify the standard for punitive damages
in tort actions and limit a plaintiff's punitive damage recovery to $250,000, with 80% of the
punitive damage award payable to a public fund. Virginia Tort Reform Proposals,supra note
6, at 1. While the Virginia General Assembly's version of the cap on punitive damages places
a $350,000 cap on punitive damages, the General Assembly's Senate Bill does not codify the
standard for punitive damages or make 80% of the punitive damage award payable to a public
fund. VA. CoDE § 8.01-38.1 (1987).
41. See Boyd v. Buala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 790 (W.D. Va. 1986) (holding unconstitutional
Virginia's statutory cap of $1,000,000 in medical malpractice action); Damage Cap Ruled
Unconstitutional,The Daily Progress, Feb. 22, 1987, at B2 (stating that Fairfax County Circuit
Court declared unconstitutional Virginia's statutory cap of $1,000,000 in medical malpractice
action); see also VA. CODE §8.01-581.15 (1984) (limiting to $1,000,000 recovery against health
care provider in medical malpractice action).
42. See VA. CoDe §8.01-581.15 (1984) (limiting to $1,000,000 recovery against health
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however, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
declared unconstitutional Virginia's statutory limitation on recovery in a
medical malpractice action."
In Boyd v. Bulala, plaintiffs Helen and Roger Boyd filed a medical
malpractice action against Dr. R. A. Bulala in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia. 45 The plaintiffs in Boyd alleged
that Dr. Bulala negligently had failed to provide Mrs. Boyd adequate care
during the labor and delivery of the Boyds' infant daughter. 46 A sevenmember jury found that Dr. Bulala was negligent and awarded the Boyds

care provider in medical malpractice action); infra notes 42-72 and accompanying text (discussing §8.01-581.15 of Virginia Code). In 1976, the Virginia General Assembly adopted section
8.01-581.15 of the Virginia Code which limits a plaintiff's total recovery in a medical malpractice
action against a health care provider to $1,000,000. VA. CODE Section 8.01-581.15 (1984).
§8.01-581.15 of the Code of Virginia provides:
In any verdict returned against, a health care provider in an action for malpractice where
the act or acts of malpractice occurred on or after October 1, 1983, which is tried
by a jury, or in any judgment entered against a health care provider in such an
action which is tried without a jury, the total amount recoverable for any injury to,
or death of, a patient shall not exceed one million dollars.
VA. CODE §8.01-581.15 (1984).
Virginia is not the only state with a cap on the total damage amount that a plaintiff may
recover in a medical malpractice action. See NEB. REv. STAT. §44-2825 (1984) (limiting to
$1,000,000 total amount of damages that plaintiff may recover in medical malpractice action,
and limiting to $100,000 health care provider's liability in medical malpractice actions); IND.
CODE §16-9.5-2-2 (1978) (limiting to $500,000 total amount of damages that plaintiff may
recover in medical malpractice action); IND. CODE §16-9.5-2-2(b) (1978) (limiting to $100,000
health care provider's total liability in medical malpractice actions); see also Johnson v. St.
Vincent Hosp. Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 598 (Ind. 1980) (declaring constitutional Indiana's cap
on recovery in medical malpractice actions); infra notes 74-90 and accompanying text (discussing
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp. Inc.).
43. 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986).
44. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 790 (W.D. Va. 1986); Damage Cap Ruled
Unconstitutional, The Daily Progress, Feb. 22, 1987, at B2 (Fairfax County Circuit Court
declared unconstitutional Virginia's statutory cap of $1,000,000 in medical malpractice action).
45. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 784. In Boyd v. Bulala, plaintiffs Helen and Roger Boyd
filed a medical malpractice action in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia on behalf of themselves and their infant daughter. Id. at 784. The Boyds alleged
that Dr. Bulala, an obstetrician, failed to provide adequate medical care while Mrs. Boyd was
in labor and during the delivery of the child. Id. The Boyds claimed that Dr. Bulala had
advised the delivery room nurses to refrain from calling Dr. Bulala from his home, several
miles away, until crowning occurred. Id. The Boyds maintained that as a result of Dr. Bulala's
instructions to the nurses, Dr. Bulala was absent during an emergency delivery of the Boyds'
infant daughter. Id. The Boyds claimed that because Dr. Bulala was not present during the
delivery of the Boyds' infant daughter, only nurses who were untrained in emergency care
attended Mrs. Boyd during labor and delivery. Id. The Boyds maintained that if Dr. Bulala
had been present during the birth and delivery of the Boyds' infant, Dr. Bulala could have
performed emergency measures that would have prevented the injuries to Mrs. Boyd and her
daughter. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that because of Dr. Bulala's negligence, their daughter was
physically and mentally handicapped. Id. The Boyds' infant daughter died six weeks after the
trial of the Boyds' claim against Dr. Bulala. Id.
46. Id.
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and their infant daughter $8.3 million. 47 Subsequently, the defendant moved

the district court, inter alia, to reduce the $8.3 million verdict to conform
to section 8.01-581.15 of the Virginia Code. 48 Section 8.01-581.15 is Virginia's statutory limit of $1,000,000 on the total damages that a plaintiff may
recover in a medical malpractice action. 49 In response, the plaintiffs alleged

that Virginia's statutory limit on damages was unconstitutional, infringing

the plaintiffs' rights to due process, equal protection, and a jury trial. 0
In addressing the plaintiffs' contention that Virginia's cap on damages

in a medical malpractice action was unconstitutional, the district court first
reviewed the plaintiffs' claim that section 8.01-581.15 of the Virginia Code
violated the plaintiffs' constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. 51
The court in Boyd noted that the Virginia Constitution guarantees equal
protection through the anti-discrimination clause and the clause prohibiting
special legislation.5 2 The district court stated, however, that the equal

protection provisions of the Virginia Constitution provide no more protection than the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the

United States Constitution. 53 The district court'stated that absent a court's

47. Id. In Boyd, the $8.3 million verdict that the Boyds received consisted of $1,850,000
in compensatory damages for the Boyds' infant daughter, $1,575,000 in compensatory damages
for Helen Boyd, and $1,175,000 in compensatory damages for Roger Boyd. Id. The jury
awarded Helen and Roger Boyd, jointly, $1,700,000 in compensatory damages for their infant's
past and future medical costs until the infant reached the age of eighteen. Id. The jury awarded
$1,000,000 in punitive damages for the infant and $1,000,000 in punitive damages for Helen
Boyd. Id.
48. Id. at 784-85; see also VA. CODE §8.01-581.15 (1984) (limiting recovery against health
care provider in medical malpractice action to $1,000,000).
49. VA. CODE §8.01-581.15 (1984).
50. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 785. In addition to maintaining that Virginia's statutory
limitation on recovery in a medical malpractice action violates equal protection and due
process, the plaintiffs in Boyd also maintained that Virginia's statutory limitation on recovery
in a medical malpractice action violates the Virginia Constitution's separation of powers clause
and prohibition against special legislation. Id.
51. Id. at 785. In Boyd, the district court stated that state courts that have reviewed the
constitutionality of medical malpractice legislation to determine whether the legislation denies
a plaintiff equal protection of the law have found that their respective state constitutions
require that the court exercise a more strict scrutiny than the review that a court normally
affords economic legislation. Id. The district court in Boyd, however, found that the equal
protection provisions in the Virginia Constitution are no stronger than the equal protection
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 785-86; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (equal protection clause). The equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall make or
enforce any law which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the
laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see VA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11 (antidiscrimination clause); VA.
CoNsT. art. 4, § 14 (prohibiting against special legislation).
52. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 786; see VA. CoNsr. art 1, § 11 (antidiscrimination clause);
VA. CONST. art. 4 § 14 (prohibition against special legislation).
53. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 786; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV (equal protection clause).
In Boyd, the district court stated that under an equal protection analysis, a court must accord
a statutory economic regulation a liberal standard of review unless the statute creates a suspect
classification or infringes a fundamental right. Id.
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finding that legislation infringes a fundamental right or creates a suspect
classification, a court must uphold a statutory economic regulation against
a plaintiff's equal protection challenge if the statute reasonably relates to a
valid legislative purpose. 54 The district court concluded that Virginia's cap
on damages reasonably relates to the Virginia legislature's purpose of
preserving health care services for Virginians by ensuring that physicians in
5
Virginia may obtain affordable medical malpractice insurance.1
In determining whether section 8.01-581.15 creates a suspect classification, the district court recognized that section 8.01-581.15 discriminates
between plaintiffs whose damages exceed $1,000,000 and plaintiffs whose
damages are less than $1,000,000.56 Moreover, the district court recognized
that the legislation distinguishes plaintiffs whose tort claims are based on a
medical malpractice action from plaintiffs whose claims are based on other
torts.5 7 The district court, however, again reasoned that the Virginia General
Assembly's purpose in enacting section 8.01-581.15 was to preserve health
care services in Virginia by ensuring that Virginia's physicians may obtain
medical malpractice liability coverage.5 8 The district court, therefore, concluded that section 8.01-581.15 did not create a suspect classification because
the Virginia General Assembly had sufficient justification for enacting
59
section 8.01-581.15.
In determining whether section 8.01-581.15 infringed upon a right that
the United States Constitution and the Virginia Constitution explicitly
guarantee, the district court in Boyd stated that the right to a full recovery
in tort is not a right that the United States Constitution or the Virginia
Constitution guarantees.60 The district court, therefore, concluded that because section 8.01-581.15 does not create a suspect classification or infringe
upon a fundamental right, the district court must uphold the constitutionality
of the statute if the statute is a rational means to achieve the legislature's
goal in enacting the statute. 61 The district court in Boyd concluded that
section 8.01-581.15 is a rational means to secure health care services in
Virginia. 62 The district court, therefore, held that section 8.01-581.15 is
63
constitutional under equal protection and due process analyses.
After holding that section 8.01-581.15 did not deny plaintiffs equal
protection of the laws and due process of law, the district court considered
whether the statute violated the plaintiffs' right to a jury trial that the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 786.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 786-87.
Id.at 787.
Id.
Id. at 787-88.
Id.
Id. at 787.
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United States Constitution and the Virginia Constitution guarantee. 64 The
district court recognized that the United States Constitution's seventh amendment jury trial guarantee does not apply to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 65 The district court stated, however, that the seventh amendment
applies in federal diversity cases such as the case at bar. 6 The court in
Boyd stated that the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that a court may not interfere with an individual's right to have
a jury determine issues of liability and assess damages.67 Moreover, the
district court stated that the Virginia Constitution provides that it is within
the province of the jury to settle questions of fact, including the question
of damages. 68 The district court concluded that section 8.01-581.15 interfered
with the jury's factfinding function. 69 The district court reasoned that the
statute requires that a court ignore a verdict that the evidence supports.0
Moreover, the court in Boyd noted that a legislature cannot preempt a
jury's factual determination on an issue that a judge has submitted to the
jury.7 1 The district court, therefore, held unconstitutional section 8.01-581.15
and affirmed the $8.3 million verdict against Dr. Bulala. 2

64. Id. at 788. The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend VII.

Article I, section 11 of the Virginia Constitution provides that:
In controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, trial by
jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred.
VA. CONST. art I, §11.

65. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 788.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 789.
69. Id. In Boyd, the district court criticized section 8.01-581.15 of the Virginia Code for
its failure to provide practical guidelines for applying the statute. Id. at 788-89. The district
court reasoned that the statute does not state whether a court should instruct the jury on the
statutory limitation of $1,000,000 before the issue of damages goes to the jury, or whether a
court should not instruct the jury on the cap and then refuse to enter judgment above that
statutory limitation. Id.
70. Id. at 789.
71.

Id.

72. Id. at 790. Following the district court's ruling in Boyd, the Medical Society of
Virginia raised its dues from $195.00 to $300.00 per year to fight for tort reform in Virginia.
Orndorff, Medical Society Votes Dues Boost to Aid Insurance Fight, The Richmond Times

Dispatch, Nov. 11, 1986, at B-9. Moreover, the Attorney General of Virginia, Mary Sue Terry,
asked the district court judge in Boyd to either abandon his decision or reopen the case so
that the Commonwealth of Virginia might present arguments to the district court on the
constitutionality of Virginia's statutory cap on damages in a medical malpractice action. Vacate
Malpractice Ruling or Reopen Case, Terry Asks, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Nov. 13, 1986,
at C-20. The attorney general argued that the district court judge's decision could affect both
the cost and availability of health care in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Id.
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Although the district court in Boyd declared unconstitutional a statutory
cap on damages in medical malpractice actions, other jurisdictions lend
support to the VLR's proposal to cap damages in medical malpractice
actions. 7 In Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.,74 the Indiana Supreme
Court held constitutional the Indiana legislature's cap on recovery in a
medical malpractice action. 71 In Johnson, the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act which, inter alia,
limits the total amount of damages that a plaintiff in Indiana may recover
in a medical malpractice action. 76 The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act
limits a plaintiffs recovery against a health care provider to $100,000. 77 A
state-operated patient's compensation fund pays any amount over the $100,000
cap on the health care provider's, liability up to a cap of $500,000.78 In
Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed that Indiana's cap on damages was unconstitutional because the cap on damages denied the plaintiffs due process,
equal protection, and the right to trial by jury. 79 The Indiana Supreme
Court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the cap denied the
plaintiffs due process and equal protection. s° The court in Johnson concluded

73. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 164, 695 P.2d 665, 684, 211
Cal Rptr. 368, 387 (1985) (declaring constitutional statutory limitation on recovery in medical
malpractice action); Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So.2d 783, 789
(Fla. 1985) (same); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 602 (Ind. 1980)
(same); Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 672 (Neb. 1977) (same); State ex rel.
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434, 448 (Wis. 1978) (same).
74. 404 N.E. 2d 585 (Ind. 1980).
75. Id. at 598.
76. See IND. CODE §16-9.5-2-2 (1978) (limiting to $500,000 total amount of damages that
plaintiff may recover in medical malpractice action); IND. CODE §16-9.5-2-2(b) (1978) (limiting
to $100,000 health care provider's total liability). In Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp. Inc., the
Supreme Court of Indiana stated that in addition to limiting the total amount of damages
that a plaintiff may recover from a defendant in a medical malpractice action, the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act limits the amount of attorney's fees that the plaintiff's attorney may
receive. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 590-91 (Ind. 1980). Moreover,
the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act limits the time in which a plaintiff may bring a medical
malpractice claim. Id. Finally, the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act establishes a patients'
compensation fund for damage awards exceeding the cap on damages. Id.; see IND. CODE
§16-9.5-1-1 to 16-9.5-10.5 (Indiana Medical Malpractice Act) (1978).
77. Johnson, 404 N.E. 2d at 598; see IND. CODE §16-9.5-2-2(b) (1978) (limiting to
$100,000 health care provider's total liability).
78. Johnson, 404 N.E.2d at 598; see IND. CODE §16-9.5-2-2 (1978) (limiting to $500,000
total amount of damages that plaintiff may recover from patient's compensation fund in
medical malpractice action).
79. Johnson, 404 N.E.2d at 585.
80. Id. at 599-601. In addressing the plaintiffs' claims that Indiana's cap on damages
denied plaintiffs due process of law and complete relief for injuries, the Indiana Supreme
Court in Johnson stated that it would uphold the statute under a due process challenge if the
statute was a rational means to achieve the legislature's goal of ensuring the availability of
health care services. Id. at 598. The court recognized that a plaintiff whose damages exceed
the $500,000 cap will not recover full damages. Id. at 600. The court, however, further
recognized that a victim benefits from the medical malpractice legislation because the cap on
damages ensures that health care is available to the plaintiff. Id. at 599. The court reasoned
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that the Indiana legislature had a rational justification for placing a cap on
damages that a plaintiff may recover against a health care provider in a
medical malpractice action. 81 The court in Johnson reasoned that a cap on
damages ensures the availability of health care services because the cap
provides a medical malpractice insurer with a mechanism for determining
82
the insurer's risks.
After determining that Indiana's cap on damages in a medical malpractice
action did not deny plaintiffs due process and equal protection, the court
in Johnson addressed the plaintiffs' claim that the Medical Malpractice
Act's cap on damages violated the plaintiffs' right to a jury trial.8 3 The
plaintiffs claimed that the right to trial-by-jury includes the right to have a
jury determine all damages for which a defendant must compensate a
plaintiffA4 The Indiana Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' claim on two
grounds. First, the court stated that under the Medical Malpractice Act the

that a cap on damages provides the insurance company with a mechanism for calculating
premiums. Id. The court in Johnson stated that an insurer cannot remain solvent if the
insurance premiums that the insurer collects are insufficient to meet the insurer's liabilities.
Id. The court concluded that the provision of the Medical Malpractice Act that places a cap
on damages is a rational means to ensure that health care services are available. Id. The court
in Johnson, therefore, held the statute constitutional. Id.
After determining that Indiana's cap on damages did not deprive plaintiffs of due process
or complete relief for injury, the court in Johnson considered plaintiffs' claim that the cap
denied plaintiffs equal protection. Id. In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed that the cap gives
physicians a special benefit, a cap on damages, that other defendants do not enjoy. Id.
Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that a plaintiff whose damages exceed $500,000 has a burden
that a plaintiff whose damages do not exceed $500,000 does not have. Id. The Indiana Supreme
Court, however, stated the cap did not deny plaintiffs equal protection. Id. at 600. The court
reasoned that because the Act did not create a suspect classification or infringe upon a
fundamental right, the court must hold that the statute is constitutional if the legislature had
a reasonable purpose for creating the classification. Id. The court in Johnson emphasized that
the plaintiffs had the burden to show that there existed no correlation between the statutory
limitation on recovery and the promotion of health care. Id. The court concluded that the
legislature had a rational justification for placing a cap on the total amount of damages that
a plaintiff can recover against a health care provider in a medical malpractice action. Id. at
600-01. The court reasoned that because of the size and number of malpractice claims, the
insurance industry had discontinued medical malpractice insurance for many health care
providers in Indiana. Id. at 601. To protect society's interest in the availability of health care
services, the legislature enacted the Medical Malpractice Act to ensure that physicians can
obtain medical malpractice insurance coverage. Id. at 601.
81. Id. at 598-99.
82. Id. In Johnson, the Supreme Court of Indiana discussed the condition of the health
care industry prior to the Medical Malpractice Act. Id. at 589. The court stated that before
the Indiana legislature enacted the Medical Malpractice Act, a majority of insurance companies
doing business in Indiana either stopped writing, or limited the number of medical malpractice
insurance policies that the insurers wrote. Id. The court stated that because health care
providers could not obtain medical malpractice insurance, some health care providers stopped
providing health care to patients. Id. at 589-90. The court noted that because some physicians
were unable to obtain malpractice insurance coverage, some hospitals discontinued emergency
services, and surgeons in some rural areas stopped providing surgical services. Id.
83. Id. at 601-02.
84. Id. at 602.
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jury only determines the amount of damages that the plaintiff will receive,
up to the $500,000 statutory cap. 5 Second, the court stated that a legislature
may set limits on damages that a jury determines. 6 The court explained
that in several circumstances a legislature may interfere with a plaintiff's
right to a jury trial . 7 The court noted, for example, that a legislature may
deny a jury trial if a party does not comply with the procedural requirements
for asserting a right to a jury trial 8 Moreover, the court noted that a
legislature may terminate a plaintiff's lawsuit through the statute of limitations.8 9 The court in Johnson concluded that the Medical Malpractice Act
allowed the jury to determine damages up to $500,000 and that the Indiana
Constitution required no more. 90
Although jurisdictions are split on whether caps on damages are constitutional under the United States Constitution or state constitutions, many
commentators support the VLR's proposal to cap noneconomic damages. 9'
The motivation behind the recommendation to cap noneconomic damages
is that the amounts of jury awards for damages such as pain and suffering
are escalating. 92 Moreover, some commentators believe that placing a mon85. Id. In Johnson, the Indiana Supreme Court stated that the jury in a medical
malpractice action determines damages up to $500,000. Id. The court stated that once the jury
determines the amount of damages against the health care provider up to the $100,000 cap on
the health care provider's liability, the trial court then instructs the jury to determine the
amount of damages due from the patient compensation fund up to the $500,000 cap on the
total damages that a plaintiff can recover from a physician in a medical malpractice action.
Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see IND. CoNsT. art I, § 20 (providing right to jury trial in civil actions).
91. Compare Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 790 (W.D. Va. 1986) (declaring
unconstitutional Virginia's cap of $1,000,000 on damages in medical malpractice action); with
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So.2d 783, 789 (Fla. 1985) (upholding
constitutionality of limits on medical malpractice damages).
Congress supports a limit on noneconomic losses in tort actions. See Robinson, The
Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970'S: A Retrospective, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 5, 3233 (Spring 1986) (Congressional legislation supporting caps on noneconomic damages in tort
actions). As a result of the American Medical Association's lobbying efforts, Congress proposed
tort reform legislation, the Federal Incentives for State Health Care Professional Liability
Reform Act of 1985 (Hatch bill). Id. The Hatch bill proposes a $250,000 limit on noneconomic
damages in a medical malpractice action. S. 1804, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 CoNG. REC.
S14356-59 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1985). The Hatch bill provides financial incentives to states that
enact the model legislation. Id.Moreover, Congress has proposed the Medical Offer and
Recovery Act of 1985 (Moore/Gephardt bill), which not only serves as model legislation for
the states, but independently affects those who benefit from Medicare, Medicaid, and health
plans for federal employees. See Robinson, supra at 32-33. Under the Moore/Gephardt bill,

if a health care provider offers to pay all economic damages in periodic installments, the
health care provider does not have to compensate the plaintiff for noneconomic damages and
the claimant is precluded from bringing a tort action against the health care provider. H.R.
3084, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 CONG. REc. H6353 (daily ed. July 25, 1985).
92. See States Seek to Curb Awards for Pain and Suffering, HosprrAls, May 5, 1986,
at 126. (noting that jury awards of noneconomic damages are escalating).
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etary amount on noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering inherently

is difficult. 93 Additionally, noneconomic damages constitute the largest

component of the damage award in a medical malpractice action.9 4 Because

insurers have difficulty predicting the amount of noneconomic damages that
a jury will award, noneconomic damages place both the health care provider

93. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 159, 695 P.2d 665, 680-81,
211 Cal.Rptr. 368, 383-84 (1985) (stating that jurist and legal scholars have noted inherent
difficulty in placing monetary amounts on damages for pain and suffering). In Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, the plaintiff challenged the California legislature's $250,000 cap
on noneconomic damages in*medical malpractice cases. Id. at 374, 695 P.2d at 671, 211
Cal.Rptr. at 145-46. See CAL. CIv. CODE §3333.2 (West 1987) (placing $250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages that plaintiff can recover against health care provider based on professional negligence). In Fein, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim against a physician.
Fein, Id. at 373, 695 P.2d at 670, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 144-45. After trial of the plaintiff's claim,
a jury awarded the plaintiff $500,000 in noneconomic damages. Id., 695 P.2d at 670, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 145. Pursuant to California's statutory limitation of $250,000 for noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases, however, the trial court reduced the plaintiff's damage
award. Id. at 382, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 157. Claiming that California's cap on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions is unconstitutional, the plaintiff appealed
the trial court's reduction of damages to the Supreme Court of California. Id., 695 P.2d at
679, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 157.
In addressing the plaintiff's claims, the Supreme Court of California in Fein stated that
the California legislature can expand or limit the amount of damages that a plaintiff may
recover against a defendant if the legislative purpose of the statutory cap is reasonably related
to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 383, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 158-59. The court
concluded that the California legislature's statutory cap on noneconomic damages in a medical
malpractice action reasonably relates to a legitimate state interest in ensuring the availability
of health care in California. Id. at 384-87, 695 P.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 160. The court
reasoned that the rising costs of medical malpractice insurance premiums had threatened the
availability of health care in California. Id. at 383, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 158-59.
Moreover, the court noted that unless insurance companies reduced the cost of malpractice
insurance, physicians may practice without medical malpractice insurance coverage. Id., 695
P.2d at 680, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 158-59. The court stated that if physicians practice without
medical malpractice insurance, plaintiffs may not be able to recover any damages from a
physician. Id., 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 158-59. The court in Fein further noted that
judges and juries have difficulty placing a monetary value on noneconomic damages. Id. at
383-84, 695 P.2d at 680-81, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 159-60. The Supreme Court of California,
therefore, held constitutional the California legislature's statutory limitation on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice actions. Id. 387, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal.Rptr. at 164.
The plaintiff in Fein subsequently appealed the California Supreme Court's decision to
the United States Supreme Court. Fein, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985), app. dismissed, 106 S.Ct.
214 (U.S.). The Supreme Court, however, refused to hear the appeal. Id. Since the Supreme
Court's refusal to hear the Fein case, commentators say that California courts are enforcing
more scrupulously the cap on noneconomic damages. See States Seek to Curb Awards for
Pain and Suffering, HosprrAts, May 5, 1986, at 128 (California courts enforce cap on
noneconomic damages more scrupulously after Fein).
94. See Ginsburg, Contractual Revisions to Liability, 49 L. & CoMTEMP. PROBS. 253,
262 (Spring 1986) (discussing proportion of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
award). The largest portion of a medical malpractice award is the plaintiff's compensation for
noneconomic damages. Id. For example, in Boyd v. Bulala, $6.6 million of the $8.3 million
verdict against Dr. Bulala was to compensate the Boyds for noneconomic and punitive damages.
Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 784.
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and the insurance company at an unpredictably high risk. 95 One commentator

states that limitations on the amount that a plaintiff may recover in 96
a
medical malpractice action will improve the insurer's ability to predict risks.

If the insurer can predict its risks, the insurer is more likely to make medical
malpractice insurance both available and affordable to a physician. 97 Additionally, Danzon states that though caps on damages have no effect on
the frequency of claims that patients file against physicians, placing caps

on the plaintiff's recovery in a medical malpractice action is the most

effective measure to decrease the severity of judgments against physicians. 9
Danzon claims that placing a cap on all or part of a plaintiff's award in a
medical malpractice action would reduce by 23% the severity of judgments

against physicians. 9
In addition to capping damages that a plaintiff may recover in a tort
action, the VLR proposed that the 1987 Virginia General Assembly permit
a defendant to pay all future damage awards to the plaintiff in periodic
payments. 100 At common law, courts required defendants to pay to plaintiffs

all past and future damages in a lump sum after the courts entered final
judgment against the defendants.101 Future damages include such damages

as the cost of future medical care and lost earning capacity and, therefore,
constitute the major components of a personal injury award.

02

Future

damages generally reach multimillion dollar proportions if the plaintiff is a
child or young adult because the life expectancy is longer and continuing
medical needs are costly. 03 The 1987 Virginia General Assembly's Senate
Bill 411, which embodied the VLR's proposal, would have required the trier

of fact in a personal injury or wrongful death action to itemize all damages,
distinguishing between past and future damages.'0 4 Senate Bill 411 also

95. See Ginsburg, supra note 94, at 262. (stating that escalating trend of noneconomic
damage awards has placed health care providers and medical malpractice insurers at high risk).
The plaintiffs' bar claims that a cap on damages is unfair to a plaintiff whose damages exceed
the cap. States Seek to Curb Awards For Pain and Suffering, HosPrrAms, May 5, 1986, at
126. Kirk Johnson, general counsel of the American Medical Association, however, responds
that the plaintiffs' bar believes that caps are unfair because a cap will reduce the amount of
an attorney's contingency fee. Id.
96. See Robinson, supra note 91, at 30 (stating that ceilings on megabuck damage
recoveries improve predictability of insurer's risk).
97. See id. (caps on damages improve insurer's ability to predict risks).
98. See Danzon, supra note 30, at 158 (stating that empirical analysis of trend in medical
malpractice claim severity demonstrates that cap on damages has been most effective means
of holding down damage awards).
99. Id.
100. See Virginia Tort Reform, supra note 6, at 1 (VLR's proposal to allow defendants
to pay future damages in periodic payments).
101. See Ginsburg, supra note 94, at 259 (stating that at common law, physician compensated plaintiff for past and future damages in one lump sum payment).
102. Id. at 260.
103. Id.
104. See Va. S. 411, 1987 General Assembly of Virginia, at 1 (proposed legislation to
allow defendants to pay future damages in periodic payments).
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would have required that after the trier of fact itemized all damages, the
trial court would enter judgment in a lump sum for all future damages up
to an aggregate of $250,000.105 The trial court, at its discretion, would then
order the defendant to pay in periodic payments any future damages that
exceeded $250,000.10 6 To ensure that the defendant paid the future damages,
the court would have required that the defendant post a bond with the
court.10 7 The 1987 Virginia General Assembly, however, rejected Senate Bill
411, which embodied the VLR's proposal regarding periodic payments of
10 8
future damages.
Although the Virginia General Assembly rejected the VLR's proposal
regarding periodic payments of future damages, commentators claim that
legislation permitting a defendant to pay future damages in periodic payments is advantageous to both plaintiffs and defendants. 109 From a plaintiff's
point of view, periodic payments of future damages eliminate any uncertainty of the valuation of the plaintiff's damages." 0 Certainty of damages
is important because a jury awards damages to a plaintiff to compensate
the plaintiff for all damages that the defendant's negligence caused."'
Uncertainty exists because a jury cannot measure, with exactness, the length
of the plaintiff's life and the subsequent future medical and financial needs
of the plaintiff." 2 As a result, a plaintiff may live longer than a jury
anticipated and a lump sum damage award may dissipate before the plaintiff's death or recovery from the injury that the defendant's negligence
caused." 3 Additionally, a plaintiff may diminish a lump sum damage award
by making a bad investment or improvidently expending the award before
the plaintiff actually needs the funds." 4 Periodic payments, however, guarantee that the defendant compensates the plaintiff for all future damages." 5
Moreover, periodic payments ensure that a plaintiff does not prematurely
exhaust the damage award." 6

105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Summary of the Regular 1987 Legislative Session of the Virginia General Assembly,
at 9.
109. See Ginsburg, supra note 94, at 254, 259 (supporting periodic payment of future
damages).
110. Id. at 259.
111. See Danzon, supra note 30, at 3 (stating that jury's damage award in tort action
designed to compensate plaintiff for all damages that defendant's negligence caused).
112. See Ginsburg, supra note 94, at 260 (discussing uncertainty of damages associated
with lump sum damage awards).
113. See id. (discussing probability that lump sum damage award in tort action may
dissipate before plaintiff's death or recovery from injury).
114. Id.
115. See id. (discussing plaintiff's advantages to receiving award for future damages in
periodic payments).
116. Id.
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From the defendant's point of view, periodic payments of future damages
eliminate the defendant's risk of overpaying the plaintiff." 7 Traditionally,
in paying a medical malpractice award, a physician had to compensate a
plaintiff for all future damages in one lump-sum payment."' If the plaintiff
died or recovered from his injuries earlier than the jury anticipated, the
physician may have compensated the plaintiff for future medical expenses
that were never rendered. 1 9 When a physician pays future damages in
periodic payments, however, a physician pays only those future damages
that the plaintiff will incur.120 The defendant physician, therefore, does not
run the risk of paying a windfall to the plaintiff.'
A second advantage to a physician who pays future damages in periodic
payments is that periodic payments eliminate the possibility that a lump
sum damage award will exceed the physician's insurance coverage and
financially and professionally ruin a physician.2 2 By paying a future damage
award in periodic payments, a physician may spread the payment of the
damage award over an extended period of time. 23 The physician may,
therefore, obtain medical insurance to meet the future needs of the plaintiff,
or establish a trust or other device to guarantee that the physician pays all
24
of the plaintiff's damages.
In addition to the VLR's tort reform proposals to cap damages and
allow a defendant to pay future damages in periodic payments, the VLR
proposed that the 1987 Virginia General Assembly limit contingency fees
for attorneys in tort actions.125 Although the Geheral Assembly did not

117. See id. at 259-60 (stating that lump sum payment to plaintiff may result in windfall
to plaintiff if plaintiff dies or recovers earlier than jury anticipated).
118. Id.at 259.
119. Id. at 259-60.
120. See id. at 261 (periodic payment of future damages eliminates guesswork regarding
future medical and living expenses of plaintiff).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 260 (stating that large lump sum damage awards may exceed physician's
medical malpractice coverage causing physician economic and professional hardships).
123. See id. at 260-61 (discussing periodic payment of future damages).
124. Id.at 261.
125. See Virginia Tort Reform Proposals, supra note 6, at 1. (VLR's proposal to limit
attorneys' contingency fee). Florida has placed limits on attorneys' contingency fees in personal
injury cases. In The Florida Bar Re Amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the Florida legislature's limitation on attorneys' contingency fees in all personal injury cases, including medical malpractice actions. The Florida Bar
Re Amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility, 494 So. 2d 960, 962 (Fla. 1986).
The Florida Supreme Court recognized that there exists no evidence that attorneys are abusing
the contingent fee system. Id. at 961. Moreover, the court recognized that some commentators
consider contingency fees the "poor man's door to the courthouse." Id. The Florida Supreme
Court, however, reasoned that the public views contingency fees as abusive in light of large
jury awards and the rising cost of liability insurance. Id. Moreover, the court stated that the
Florida legislature had perceived abuses in the contingent fee system since the legislature had
enacted a model for contingent fees in medical malpractice actions. Id. The court, therefore,
upheld the legislation limiting attorneys' contingency fees. Id. at 962.
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adopt the ,VLR's proposal to limit an attorney's contingency fee, several
arguments support limits on contingency fees. First, limits on an attorney's
contingency fee will encourage an attorney to be more selective in deciding
whether to file a plaintiff's lawsuit against a physician. 126 Some commentators claim that a plaintiff is more likely to pursue a meritless medical
malpractice claim against a physician when the plaintiff compensates his
attorney on a contingency fee basis.1 27 The rationale is that the plaintiff has
nothing to lose because the plaintiff compensates his attorney only if the
plaintiff recovers from the physician. 28 A second argument for limiting an
attorney's contingency fee is that the plaintiff's attorney sometimes will
receive a windfall if the plaintiff obtains a large damage award. 29 When a
plaintiff compensates his attorney on a contingency fee basis, the attorney
usually retains up to fifty percent of the amount that the plaintiff recovers
from the defendant. 30 For example, when a jury verdict is $8.3 million
such as in Boyd v. Bulala, the attorney's fee, could range from $2.5 million,
if the contingency fee were thirty percent, to $4.15 million, if the contingency
fee were fifty percent.' 3' A plaintiff's attorney in a medical malpractice
action, therefore, sometimes receives compensation greater than the compensation required for the actual time that the plaintiff's attorney put into
the case.' 32 A third argument for limiting an attorney's contingency fee is
that when a plaintiff compensates his attorney on a contingency fee basis,
the attorney has a stake in the litigation and is more likely to gamble or
impede settlement.1
Despite commentators arguments in favor of limiting an attorney's
contingency fee, Danzon believes that legislative limits on an attorney's
contingency fee does not provide a solution to the problems associated with
medical malpractice insurance.1'4 Danzon disagrees with the contention that
contingency fees lead attorneys to bring frivolous lawsuits. 35 Danzon argues
that if an attorney's sole means of compensation for representing a plaintiff

126. Id.
127. See Danzon, supra note 30, at 196 (stating that plaintiff is more likely to bring
meritless malpractice claim against physician when plaintiff compensates his attorney on
contingency fee basis).
128. Id.
129. See Danzon, supra note 30, at 197 (stating that on average, contingency fees
overcompensate plaintiff's attorney for amount of time attorney spent on case).
130. See Danzon, supra note 30, at 197 (stating that contingency fees for attorneys
generally do not exceed 50%); see also Doctors and Lawyers Face Off, A.B.A.J., July 1,

1986, at 39 (stating that only 28 cents of each dollar awarded in medical malpractice action
is paid to plaintiff).
131. See Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 784 (W.D. Va. 1986) ($8.3 million dollar
verdict against physician).
132. See Danzon, supra note 30, at 197 (stating that empirical analysis shows that
attorney's contingency fee overcompensates attorney by 66% for attorney's time spent on cases
that attorney wins).
133. Id. at 195.
134. Id. at 195-98.
135. Id. at 196.
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is a contingency fee, this conditional means of compensation will deter the
attorney from bringing a potentially unsuccessful lawsuit. 36 Danzon, therefore, maintains that an attorney whom a plaintiff compensates on a hourly
basis, regardless of the outcome, is more likely to bring a meritless lawsuit
than the attorney who works on a contingency fee basis. 37 Finally, Danzon
believes that limits on contingency fees not only limit the attorney's fees,
but also reduce the plaintiff's recovery. 38 Danzon concludes that unless
legislators constrain the defense attorney's fee, there exists no ground for
limiting the contingency fee of the plaintiff's attorney in a medical malpractice action as a measure to ease the medical malpractice insurance
39
situation.'
Although Danzon does not believe that limits on an attorney's contingency fee will remedy completely the medical malpractice insurance availability and affordability problems, Danzon does concede that medical
malpractice suits against physicians will decrease if contingency fees are
unavailable to plaintiffs.4 Danzon reasons that with a contingency fee, the
plaintiff is risk-free and, therefore, more likely to bring a meritless complaint.1'4 Danzon also states that a plaintiff overcompensates an attorney
42
who works on a contingency fee basis for cases that the attorney wins.
Danzon maintains, however, that a plaintiff benefits from a contingency
fee arrangement because the plaintiff is able to bring a medical malpractice
43
action even if the plaintiff cannot afford to pay an attorney's fee.
Although the VLR did not persuade the 1987 Virginia General Assembly
to limit contingency fees for attorneys, the General Assembly did adopt the
VLR's proposal to sanction attorneys who file frivolous lawsuits and motions.1' 4 Section 8.01-271.1 of the Virginia Code, which is modeled after
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 5 requires that an attorney
certify that all pleadings, motions, and other papers are filed in good

136. Id. at 196-97.
137. Id.

138. Id. at 198. Danzon states that statutory limits on an attorney's contingency fee
reduces the average settlement size by 9%; increases the percentage of cases that a plaintiff

withdraws from 430 to 48%; and reduces the percentage of cases litigated to verdict from
6.1o to 4.6% Id.
139. Id.
140. See Danzon, supra note 30, at 196-98 (stating that number of medical malpractice
suits is greater with contingency fees, but regulation of contingency fees will not ease medical

malpractice crisis).
141. Id. at 196-97.
142. Id. at 197.
143. Id.
144. See Virginia Tort Reform Proposals,supra note 6, at 1. (VLR's proposal to sanction
attorneys who filed frivolous lawsuits); VA. CODE § 8.01-271.1 (1987) (legislation sanctioning
attorneys who file pleadings, motions, or other papers in bad faith).
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1986) (requiring that attorney sign all pleadings, motions,
or other papers, and providing that attorney's signature constitutes attorney's certification of
good faith filing).
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faith. 146 If an attorney certifies a pleading, motion, or other paper in
violation of section 8.01-271.1, a court may require that the attorney
compensate an opposing party whom the filing prejudices for any reasonable
expenses, including attorneys fees, that the opposing party incurred because
47
of the frivolous filing.'
Section 8.01-271.1, which imposes sanctions on attorneys who file frivo-

lous suits, may be an effective measure to combat the medical malpractice
insurance availability and affordability problems that Virginia's physicians
are facing.' 48 Insurance companies determine the availability and cost of
medical malpractice insurance to a physician, inter alia, based on the number
of claims that patients have filed against a physician. 49 Therefore, if a
plaintiff withdraws his claim or a court dismisses the plaintiff's claim against
a physician before the plaintiff establishes that the physician was negligent,

a medical malpractice insurer will consider this claim when determining
whether to insure the physician and at what rate.' 50 Under section 8.01271.1, however, a plaintiff's attorney has an affirmative obligation to
examine the merits of a case against a physician before filing a medical
malpractice claim.' 5' Section 8.01-271.1, therefore, may reduce the number
of meritless claims against physicians. Consequently, insurers would consider

fewer meritless claims when determining the availability and cost of a

52
physician's medical malpractice insurance.'
Section 8.01-271.1, which imposes sanctions on attorneys who file frivo-

attorney from filing meritless claims or motions against a physician. Without
the aid of legislation such as section 8.01-271.1, a physician's only recourse
against an attorney who files a frivolous lawsuit against the physician is to

file a countersuit against the attorney alleging malicious prosecution or, in
Virginia, abuse of process. '1S3Physicians, however, generally must sustain a
high burden of proof to recover on a claim of malicious prosecution against
an attorney who files a frivolous medical malpractice suit against a physician.'5 4 In Berlin v. Nathan,'55 for example, the Appellate Court of Illinois

146. See VA. CODE § 8.01-271.1 (1987) (proposing addition to Virginia Code requiring
that courts sanction attorneys who file pleadings, motions, or other papers in bad faith).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Danzon, supra note 30, at 89-96 (discussing factors that medical malpractice
insurers consider when determining whether to insure physician); Telephone interview with
Richard J. Olten, attorney, Virginia Professional Underwriters, Inc. (June 1987).
150. Id.

151. See VA. CODE § 8.01-271.1 (1987) (proposed section to Virginia Code that requires
that courts sanction attorneys who file pleadings and motions in bad faith).
152. See Danzon, supra note 30, at 89-96 (discussing factors that medical malpractice
insurers consider when determining whether to provide medical malpractice coverage to
physician).
153. See Danzon, supra note 30, at 204-07 (stating that physician's recourse against
plaintiff who files groundless litigation is countersuit for malicious prosecution).
154. See Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Il1.App. 3d. 940, 945-46, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1370-71 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978) (physician's claim against attorney not sufficient to justify finding of malicious
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held that to support a claim of malicious prosecution, a physician must
prove that an attorney acted maliciously and with an improper motive in
56
filing a medical malpractice claim against a physician.
Analysis of the tort reform legislation that the 1987 Virginia General
Assembly adopted reveals that the reforms are effective measures to combat
the availability and affordability problems that Virginia's physicians are
facing in obtaining medical malpractice insurance. 15 7 The Medical Society
of Virginia's Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act already
has made available to obstetricians medical malpractice insurance coverage.' Additionally, the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act may benefit infants by allowing an infant to recover for
birth-related neurological injuries in a timely manner, without the expense
of litigation. 59
The VLR's tort reform proposals that the 1987 Virginia General Assembly adopted also will enable physicians to obtain medical malpractice in-

prosecution because physician did not allege that attorney acted in malicious manner in filing
medical malpractice claim against physician); infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text
(discussing Berlin v. Nathan).
155. 64 Il. App. 3d. 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (III. App. Ct. 1978).
156. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 944-45, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1373 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978). In Berlin v. Nathan, a physician filed a countersuit against a patient's attorneys, alleging
that the attorneys brought the patient's medical malpractice suit against the physician without
having reasonable cause to believe that the physician had committed malpractice. Berlin v.
Nathan, 63 11. App. 3d 940, 943-44, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). The physician
alleged that before initiating a medical malpractice suit, the attorneys failed to obtain an
opinion from another physician confirming that the physician had committed medical malpractice. Id., 381 N.E.2d at 1369. Moreover, the physician claimed that the patient's ad
damnum clause did not relate reasonably to the patient's alleged injuries. Id., 381 N.E.2d at
1369. The physician argued that because of the high ad damnum clause, the physician would
be unable to obtain medical malpractice insurance at a reasonable rate. Id. at 943-44, 381
N.E.2d at 1369.
In Berlin, the trial jury determined that both the patient and her attorneys had acted in
a malicious manner in prosecuting a medical malpractice claim against the physician. Id. at
945, 381 N.E.2d at 1370. The jury awarded the physician compensatory and punitive damages.
Id., 381 N.E.2d at 1370. On appeal, however, the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the
decision of the trial court. Id. at 945, 381 N.E.2d at 1370. The court noted that to prove a
claim for malicious prosecution against an attorney, the physician must show that the attorney
acted maliciously or knew that his client acted in a malicious manner. Id. at 948-50, 381
N.E.2d at 1372-73. The court in Berlin stated that the physicians's complaint did not support
a finding that the attorneys acted maliciously or knew that their client had acted maliciously.
Id. at 949-50, 381 N.E.2d at 1372-73. The court further stated that willful and wanton
misconduct does not rise to the level of malicious conduct and that the physician's complaint
only stated that the attorneys did not get an opinion from a second physician before filing
suit. Id., 381 N.E.2d at 1372. The court, therefore, held that the physician's complaint was
insufficient to show a claim of malicious prosecution. Id. at 948-49, 381 N.E.2d at 1373.
157. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text (discussing proposals for tort reform in
Virginia).
158. See supra notes 12-29 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Compensation Act).
159. Id.
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surance. The VLR-supported legislation that limits punitive damages and

sanctions attorneys who file frivolous lawsuits will assist Virginia's physicians
in obtaining medical malpractice insurance. '6 First, a $350,000 cap on
punitive damages will provide an insurer with a mechanism for determining
liability risks.' 6' The new law assures a medical malpractice insurer that a
plaintiff may recover no more than $350,000 in punitive damages. 6 Second,
court-imposed sanctions on attorneys who file frivolous lawsuits will reduce

the number of meritless claims and motions that attorneys file against
physicians. 63 Because medical malpractice insurers base their decisions to
insure a physician on the number of claims that patients have filed against
the physician, a reduction in the number of meritless complaints against
the physician will help the physician obtain medical malpractice insurance
at affordable rates.'64
Acceptance by the Virginia General Assembly of the VLR's rejected
proposals would improve further the medical malpractice situation for
Virginia's physicians. 65 The VLR's proposal to allow physicians to pay
future damages in periodic payments would ensure that defendants compensate plaintiffs for all future damages while protecting the physician from

paying to the plaintiff a windfall beyond the physician's medical malpractice
insurance coverage. 66 Moreover, the VLR's proposal to limit an attorney's
contingency fee would influence the plaintiffs' attorneys to ascertain that a

patient's malpractice claim against a physician is meritorious before the
attorney files a medical malpractice claim against a physician. 6 7

SANDRA J. MORRIS

160. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing VLR's proposal to cap punitive
damages); notes 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing VLR's proposal to sanction attorneys
who file frivolous suits).
161. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing effects of caps on damages).
162. See VA. CODE § 8.01-38.1 (1987) (limiting punitive damages to $350,000 in civil
actions).
163. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text (discussing effects of court-imposed
sanctions on attorneys who file frivolous lawsuits).
164. Id.
165. See supra note 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing VLR's tort reform proposals
that 1987 Virginia General Assembly did not adopt).
166. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text (discussing proposals for tort reform
that would allow defendant to pay future damages in periodic payments rather than in lump
sum payment).
167. See supra notes 126-33 & 140-43 and accompanying text (discussing proposals for
tort reform that would limit attorney's contingency fees).

